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CORNMAN v. DAWSON
Exclusive Jurisdiction - The Key To Voting Rights
For Residents Of Federal Enclaves
Cornman v. Dawson'
INTRODUCTION
The federal government is the largest single owner of real estate
in the nation, holding title to approximately one quarter of the terri-
torial expanse of the continental United States.2 The majority of this
1. 295 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md.), appeal granted sub nom. Evans v. Cornman,
38 U.S.L.W. 3114 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1969) (No. 236).
2. As of 1952 the federal government owned approximately 455 million acres or
23% of the land area of the continental United States. See Note, Federal Areas:




land is reserved for national parks, national forests, conservation dis-
tricts, and other functions which do not require permanent residents.8
The remaining areas have been acquired for such varied uses as mili-
tary bases, hospitals, public housing, atomic energy and space agency
development. Such uses require the presence of many residents to
maintain the federal area or enclave.' Because most of these enclaves
are located within the territorial limits of a state, questions often arise
whether enclave residents are entitled to the benefits of citizenship of
the state in which the enclave is situated. One such question is whether
enclave residents can be considered residents of the state for purposes
of voting in state elections. The solution to this question has tradi-
tionally hinged on whether the federal government possesses exclusive
jurisdiction over the enclave. Generally, where exclusive jurisdiction
has existed, enclave residents have not been considered state citizens,
and, in the absence of statute, have been denied the right to vote in
local elections.5 However, to the extent the state imposes substantial
burdens on enclave residents normally incident to state residence or
citizenship, there is recent authority for allowing the enclave resident
the right to vote.6 As will be discussed, whether these later cases are
correct may depend on two considerations: first, whether the historical
term "exclusive jurisdiction" is given a technical or an operative mean-
ing, and second, whether the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment requires the state to accord voting rights where it imposes
burdens of state citizenship.
In Cornman v. Dawson,7 plaintiffs were residents of the National
Institutes of Health in Montgomery County, Maryland, and had been
registered voters in the state for several years.' Following a review
of the county voters' records by the Permanent Board of Registry,
they were informed that their names would be removed from the list
because, as residents of federal property, they did not qualify to vote
under the state constitution.9 Plaintiffs brought suit seeking a declara-
3. The United States does not exercise any form of legislative jurisdiction over
most federally owned lands. About 95% of all federal land is held as an ordinary
proprietor. See Sewell, The Federal Enclave, 33 TSNN. L. Rsv. 283, 285 (1966).
4. In addition, enclave residency may stem from the obligation of the government
to provide quarters for servicemen or for civilians in remote areas.
5. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 42 Mass. (1 Met.) 580 (1841) ;.Sinks v.
Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306 (1869). It must be noted, however, that most enclave residents,
especially servicemen, already have the right to vote in national elections via absentee
ballots since they can maintain citizenship in their home state although physically
absent from it. See Knowlton v. Knowlton, 155 Ill. 158, 39 N.E. 595 (1895) ; Annot.,
140 A.L.R. 1100 (1942).
6. See, e.g., Arapajolu v. McMenamin, 113 Cal. App. 2d 824, 249 P.2d 318
(Dist. Ct. App. 1952) ; Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 1193 (1954).
7. 295 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md.), appeal granted sub nom. Evans v. Cornman,
38 U.S.L.W. 3114 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1969) (No. 236).
8. During that tim, most of the plaintiffs, as enclave residents, were deemed to
have fulfilled all the requirements for voting set forth in article I, section 1 of the
Maryland Constitution. Additionally, two plaintiffs who had not previously registered
were denied the right to register.
9. Article I, section 1 of the Maryland constitution requires that a voter be one
"who has been a resident of the state for one year and of... the county, in which he
may offer to vote, for six months, next preceding the elections." In Royer v. Board
of Election Supervisors, 231 Md. 561, 191 A.2d 446, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 921 (1963),
the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that residents of federal enclaves could not be
considered state residents for voting purposes. Inhabitants of areas under exclusive
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tory judgment and injunctive relief to prevent this removal. They
alleged that the voting requirements as recited in the Maryland con-
stitution denied them the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. The
court held that to deprive these enclave residents of the right to vote
in local elections was a violation of their constitutional rights. The
basis for the court's decision was that the federal government had
ceased to exercise "exclusive jurisdiction" over the area in question
and that ". . . the incidents of jurisdiction exercised by Maryland
over these plaintiffs are sufficiently weighty that the important right
claimed here cannot be constitutionally denied."'" If significant por-
tions of jurisdiction have been returned to the state so that federal
jurisdiction may no longer be said to be exclusive, and if all other
prerequisites of state residence have been met, then residency within
a federal enclave fulfills the statutory requirements for voting in
state elections.
FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER ENCLAVES
The federal government may acquire land in any of three ways:
retention of public lands not disposed of under public land laws;"
purchase or condemnation of land under the right of eminent domain ;12
and cession by a state in accordance with article I, section 8, clause
17 of the United States Constitution.'3 The latter method, cession or
purchase with state consent, was considered for many years the only
manner in which the United States could gain exclusive jurisdiction.
Since 1885, however, the federal government has been able to reserve
exclusive jurisdiction over public lands within a state at the time
federal jurisdiction, therefore, ceased to fulfill the constitutional residency require-
ments and, in the opinion of the Board of Election Supervisors, could properly be
removed from voters' lists.
10. 295 F. Supp. at 659. See text accompanying notes 66-75 infra.
11. Gerwig, The Elective Franchise for Residents of Federal Areas, 24 GEo.
WASH. L. Rsv. 404, 405 (1956). Approximately 90% of all federal lands have been
acquired (or reserved) in this manner. Note, Federal Areas: The Confusion of a
Jurisdictional-Geographical Dichotomy, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 124 (1952), citing,
GRAPHic NoTEs ON TH9 PUBLIc DOMAIN 2 (Dep't of the Interior, Bureau of Land
Management 1950).
12. Gerwig, The Elective Franchise for Residents of Federal Areas, 24 Gro.
WASH. L. Rgv. 404, 405 (1958). "[T]he right of eminent domain [possessed by the
federal government] may be exercised within the States, so far as is necessary to the
enjoyment of the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution." Kohl v. United
States, 91 U.S. 367, 372 (1875). See Note, Federal Areas: The Confusion of a
Jurisdictional--Geographical Dichotomy, 101 U. PA. L. Rxv. 124 (1952).
13. Gerwig, The Elective Franchise for Residents of Federal Areas, 24 Gto.
WASH. L. RZv. 404, 405 (1958). U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 empowers Congress:
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District ...
as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become
the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority
over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which
the Same shall be for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards,
and other needful Buildings. . . (emphasis added).
The phrase "exclusive legislation" necessarily implies "exclusive jurisdiction." James
v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 141 (1937) ; State v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. 138
(1930) ; Opinion of the Justices, 42 Mass. (1 Met.) 580, 582 (1841).
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that state was admitted to the Union.14 Furthermore, it is now recog-
nized that states may cede exclusive sovereignty over land previously
held by the United States as an ordinary proprietor.' 5 Prior to 1940,
sole federal authority was presumed accepted as soon as the land was
granted by the state,' 6 with the result that in many instances exclusivejurisdiction may have arisen where it was not really desired or
necessary.' 7  At present, however, in addition to the state's cession,
there must be a specific acceptance by the United States before exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction arises. I' Thus, a state may cede jurisdiction
to the federal government, but unless express acceptance is forth-
coming, jurisdiction over the area remains with the state.
In consenting to federal authority, the states can specifically
reserve powers not inconsistent with the effective use of the land by
the federal government. 9 Originally, only the right to serve civil and
criminal process within the federal area could be withheld.2" In sub-
sequent decisions, however, the right to tax private property or cor-
porate franchises, 21 to open roads and maintain them,2 2 and to maintain
railroad rights of way" have been held valid reservations, not inter-
fering with federal use of the area. While the issue is not free from
doubt, it would seem that states now could reserve the elective franchise
for enclave residents should they desire to do so. 2 4  Land for the
14. See Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 526 (1885) ; Sewell, The
Federal Enclave, 33 TxNN. L. Ri. 283, 286 (1966); Note, Land under Exclusive
Federal Jurisdiction: An Island Within a State, 58 YALS L.J. 1402 (1949).
15. Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885); Sewell, The Federal
Enclave, 33 TznN. L. REv. 283, 286 (1966). Where land is acquired without the state's
consent, as by the right of eminent domain, the United States holds as an ordinary
proprietor. See, e.g., Porthier v. Rodman, 291 F. 311 (1st Cir. 1923) ; 37 YALE L.J.
796, 797 (1928).
16. 40 U.S.C. 255 (1964). It was held in Adams v. United States, 319 U.S. 312(1943), that specific acceptance of the state cession is required to gain concurrent as
well as exclusive jurisdiction. "The Act [40 U.S.C. § 255] created a definite method
of acceptance of jurisdiction so that all persons could know whether the government
had obtained 'no jurisdiction at all or partial [concurrent] jurisdiction, or exclusivejurisdiction.' " Id. at 314.
17. See Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 330 (1892) ; Fort Leavenworth
R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 528 (1885).
18. See Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325 (1892); Fort Leavenworth R.R.
v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885). Unnecessary exclusive federal jurisdiction would seem
to no longer arise. See, e.g., Johnson v. Morrill, 20 Cal. 2d 446, 126 P.2d 873 (1942)
State v. Corcoran, 155 Kan. 714, 128 P.2d 999 (1942).
19. In Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885), the Court held
that where land was acquired other than by purchase with consent, the state could, in
ceding jurisdiction to the United States, reserve any powers not inconsistent with
federal use of the land. This was extended to include lands purchased with consent
of the state pursuant to article I, section 8, clause 17 of the United States Constitution
in James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
20. See Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885) ; Rogers v. Squiers,
157 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1946) ; Opinion of the Justices, 42 Mass. (1 Met.) 580 (1841).
This withholding was permitted to prevent enclaves from becoming havens for fugi-
tives. See Note, Federal Areas: The Confusion of a Jurisdictional-Geographical
Dichotomy, 101 U. PA. L. Rzv. 124 (1952).
21. Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885).
22. See United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. 138 (1930); cf. In re Ladd, 74 F. 31
(C.C.D. Neb. 1896) ; Baker v. State, 47 Tex. Crim. 482, 83 S.W. 1122 (1904).
23. See Chicago, R.I., & Pac. R.R. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542 (1885); Fort
Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885).
24. See Rothfels v. Southworth, 11 Utah 2d 169, 356 P.2d 612, 614 (1960) ; CAL.
Gov'w Cone § 119 (West 1955) ; cf. Johnson v. Morrill, 20 Cal. 2d 446, 126 P.2d 873(1942). Contra, Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306 (1869) ; State ex rel. Lyle v. Willett,
117 Tenn. 334, 97 S.W. 299 (1906).
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National Institutes of Health, wherein plaintiffs in Cornman resided,
was purchased by the federal government, with state consent, in 1952.25
Only the right to serve process within the federal enclave was reserved
by Maryland, 6 and the ceded jurisdiction was expressly accepted by
the United States.
RETROCESSION OF JURISDICTION
Traditionally, the resident of a federal enclave was simply not a
resident of the state in which it was located, and, therefore, no consti-
tutional right of the enclave resident was infringed by the state's
refusal to grant him the right to vote. So settled was the view that
the federal enclave was not "within" the state, that some state courts
overthrew reservations in the cession of jurisdiction to the federal
government attempting to save the vote for residents of the area.28
Courts taking such a view saw such provisions as violations of state
constitutions, most of which require state residence as a qualification
for voting. Similar reservations of voting power might now be allowed,
however, since the Supreme Court has rejected the theory of the
extra-territoriality of the federal enclave.29
25. MD. ANN. COD4 art. 96, §§ 31, 36, 37 (1964).
26. MD. ANN. COng art. 96, §§ 34, 36 (1964).
27. E.g., Herken v. Glynn, 151 Kan. 855, 101 P.2d 946 (1940) ; Royer v. Board
of Election Supervisors, 231 Md. 561, 191 A.2d 446, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 921 (1963) ;
Opinion of the Justices, 42 Mass. (1 Met.) 580 (1841) ; Arledge v. Mabry, 52 N.M.
303, 197 P.2d 884 (1948) ; Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306 (1869) ; Annot., 34
A.L.R.2d 1193 (1954); see 109 U. PA. L. REv. 1014 (1961).
28. Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306 (1869) ; State ex rel. Lyle v. Willett, 117
Tenn. 334, 97 S.W. 299 (1906). See Comment, Constitutional Law: Jurisdiction Over
Nationally Owned Areas Within the States: Jurisdiction Over National Parks Within
the States: Jurisdiction Over Yosemite National Park, 24 CALIF. L. ltv. 573,
590-91 (1936).
29. See Howard v. Commissioners, 334 U.S. 624, 626 (1954), where the Court
stated: "The fiction of a state within a state can have no validity to prevent the state
from exercising its power over the federal area within its boundaries so long as there
is no interference with the jurisdiction of the federal government." Rothfels v.
Southworth, 11 Utah 169, 356 P.2d 612, 614 (1960); cf. Johnson v. Morrill, 20 Cal.
2d 446, 126 P.2d 873 (1942) ; State v. Corcoran, 155 Kan. 714, 128 P.2d 999 (1942).
But see Sewell, The Federal Enclave, 33 TENN. L. Rrv. 283, 287 (1966).
Many interesting arguments have arisen from attempts to gain voting rights
for enclave residents. In Arledge v. Mabry, 52 N.M. 303, 197 P.2d 884 (1948),
residents of sections of the Los Alamos Atomic Energy Commission reservation were
held to be qualified voters in New Mexico since the federal government did not
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over these areas. The suit, however, concerned the
legality of the votes of the enclave residents, which were cast on another part of the
reservation which was under exclusive federal jurisdiction. The court ruled that these
votes were not cast in New Mexico as required by the state constitution and were
therefore invalid. This and various other attempts to persuade the courts that enclave
residents are entitled to the elective franchise have failed in all but a few cases. The
support for allowing residents of federal enclaves to vote in state elections consists of
only three decisions: Arapajolu v. McMenamin, 113 Cal. App. 2d 824, 249 P.2d 318
(Dist. Ct. App. 1952) ; Rothfels v. Southworth, 11 Utah 2d 169, 356 P.2d 612 (1960) ;
Adams v. Londeree, 139 W. Va. 748, 83 S.E.2d 127 (1954). In addition, Kashman v.
Board of Elections, 54 Misc. 2d 543, 282 N.Y.S.2d 394 (Sup. Ct. Onadaga Co. 1967),
which decided that a resident of an area held by the United States as an ordinary
proprietor could vote in local elections, expressed the view that residency on a federal
enclave should be a neutral factor in determining whether a person had voting rights.
The real question, in the court's opinion, was whether the person had the intention to
establish a permanent domicile within the local subdivision.
Most courts have adhered to the traditional view that residents of enclaves
over which the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction are not residents of the
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In addition to the right to vote in state elections, residents of
federal enclaves at one time were denied most other rights accorded
state citizens."0 The states, in turn, could not enforce any of their
laws on the enclave resident since he was not "within" the state.8 '
This made the federal enclave a void within the geographical boun-
daries of the state in which neither state law nor the rights and
privileges of state citizenship applied. Both the states and the federal
government have taken statutory action in an attempt to correct the
situation. Shortly after the decision in Lowe v. Lowe, 2 which held
that a resident of a federal enclave in Maryland had not acquired state
residence for the purpose of filing a divorce suit, the state legisla-
ture passed a statute permitting such residents to use state courts for
divorce matters." This was later extended to include adoption pro-
state in which the enclave is located. These courts reason that if a change in voting
status is warranted, it should come through the state legislature or through Congress,
via a retrocession of jurisdiction to the states, and not through judicial decision.
The court in Royer v. Board of Election Supervisors, 231 Md. 561, 566, 191
A.2d 446, 449, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 921 (1963), concluded that "If a change is
desirable . . . we think it should be through adjustment by the sovereign legislative
bodies and not imposed by the courts." The opinions in Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St.
306 (1869) and State ex rel. Lyle v. Willett, 117 Tenn. 334, 97 S.W. 299 (1906)
both expressed the opinion that an amendment to the state constitution would be
needed to give enclave residents the right to vote. See Arledge v. Mabry, 52 N.M.
303, 197 P.2d 834 (1948) ; Comment, Constitutional Law: Jurisdiction Over Nationally
Owned Areas Within the States: Jurisdiction Over National Parks Within the States:
Jurisdiction Over Yosemite National Park, 24 CALIF. L. Rtv. 573, 588-91 (1936);
109 U. PA. L. Rgv. 1014, 1015 (1961), citing, INT4RDtPARTMZNTAL COMMITrM FOR
THZ STUDY OF JURISDICTION OVER FEDERAL AReAs WITHIN THX STATES, pt. II, at
224-25 (1957).
30. In addition to the right of suffrage, enclave residents, since they were not
considered state residents, were denied attendance at public schools, Stanford Graded
Common School District v. Powell, 145 Ky. 93, 140 S.W. 67 (1911), qualification
for state supported services such as welfare, People v. Lyons, 374 Ill 557 30 N.E.2d
46 (1940). But see Green v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 270 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del.
1967), access to civil courts in divorce, Lowe v. Lowe, 150 Md. 592 133 A. 729 (1926),
probate, McCormick v. Sullivant, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 192 (1 8 2 5), or adoption pro-
ceedings, Lowe v. Lowe, 150 Md. 592, 133 A. 729 (1926), hunting and fishing licenses,
In re Eberle, 98 F. 295 (N.D. Ill. 1899), McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876),
and reduced tuition at state universities, Waugh v. University of Miss., 237 U.S. 589
(1915) ; Connell v. Gray, 127 P. 417 (Okla. 1912). See Comment, Exclusive Federal
Jurisdiction Over State-Ceded Land, 4 ST. Louis L.J. 334, 337 (1957).
31. The state was deprived of taxing power within the federal enclave since state
excise tax, State v. Blair, 238 Ala. 377, 191 So. 237 (1939), personal property taxes,
Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647 (1930), and inheritance taxes, In re
Grant's Estate, 83 Misc. 257, 144 N.Y.S. 567 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1913), could not be
collected. Also, a corporation acting solely within a federal area could not be taxed
for the privilege of doing business within the state. Winston Bros. Co. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 156 Ore. 505, 62 P.2d 7 (1936).
State licensing and building ordinances may be inapplicable to federal areas,
Peterson v. United States, 191 F.2d 154 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 885 (1951) ;
United States v. City of Chester, 144 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1944), and crimes committed
within federal areas did not fall under state jurisdiction in some cases. Rogers v.
Squier, 157 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1946). State industrial insurance and workmen's
compensation laws also did not apply to the enclave. Martin v. Clinton Constr. Co.,
41 Cal. App. 2d 35, 105 P.2d 1029 (1940) ; Utley v. State Indus. Comm'n, 176 Okla.
255, 55 P.2d 762 (1936) ; Murray v. Joe Gerrick & Co., 172 Wash. 365, 20 P.2d
591 (1933).
32. 150 Md. 592, 133 A. 729 (1926).
33. MD. ANN. CODa art. 16, § 23 (1964).
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ceedings as well. 4 Other states have enacted similar laws allowing
enclave residents the use of state courts.35
There are many state laws which may now be applied to areas of
exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to federal statutes. 6 The first enact-
ment returning portions of the federal government's exclusive juris-
diction over enclaves to the states was passed by Congress in 1928.
This statute provides for state jurisdiction over wrongful deaths
occurring on federal enclaves.3 7 During the next twelve years, Con-
gress authorized the states to extend to federal enclaves their work-
men's compensation 88 and unemployment insurance laws, 9 and, through
passage of the Lea Act, ° permitted the levying of state fuel taxes on
motor fuels sold within the enclaves.
Probably the most significant of the retrocession statutes was the
Buck Act of 1940."1 This enactment gives the states authority to levy
and collect sales, use, and income taxes within federal enclaves. The
constitutionality of the right to levy income taxes on residents or
those employed on federal enclaves was tested in Kiker v. City of
Philadelphia.42 The court found that an employee of the Philadelphia
Navy Yard was not deprived of property "without due process of
law" by having to pay a Philadelphia earnings tax. Since all the
benefits of the city were legally available to him, he received something
in return for his taxes. 3
Congress at an early date enacted legislation to deal with criminal
offenses applicable to federal territory. The first Assimilative Crimes
Act," enacted in 1825, provided that the criminal laws of the state
are applicable to federal enclaves in the absence of congressional statute.
The earlier statute required periodic re-enactments to keep current
with changes in state penal law since only the state law in effect at the
time of enactment could be applied to the enclave.43 The Assimilative
Crimes Act,46 however, now provides that the state law in force at
34. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 69 (1964).
35. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1603(b) (1964).
36. See Sewell, The Federal Enclave, 33 TENN. L. Rv. 283, 306-11 (1966);
Note, Federal Areas: The Confusion of a Jurisdictional-Geographical Dichotomy,
101 U. PA. L. REv. 124 (1952); Note, State Control Over Federal Areas, 12 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 80 (1943).
37. 16 U.S.C. § 457 (1964).
38. 40 U.S.C. § 290 (1964).
39. 26 U.S.C. § 3305(d) (1964).
40. 4 U.S.C. § 104 (1964).
41. 4 U.S.C. §§ 105-10 (1964).
42. 346 Pa. 624, 31 A.2d 289, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 741 (1943). Cf. James v.
Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937) (where the right to tax enclave residents
was reserved in the grant of cession by the state).
43. State taxing power was further increased in 1947, when an enactment per-
mitted the states to tax a lessee's interest in real estate leased by the federal govern-
ment from within an enclave. 10 U.S.C. § 2667(e) (1964).
44. 4 Stat. 115 (now 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1964)).
45. See Cornman v. Dawson, 295 F. Supp. 654, 657 (D. Md.), appeal granted sub
nom. Evans v. Cornman, 38 U.S.L.W. 3114 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1969) (No. 236), citing,
INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF JURISDICTION OVER FEDERAL AREAs
WITHIN THE STATES, pt. II, at 126-31 (1957).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1964).
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the time of the offense governs if there is no pertinent federal law,
thereby eliminating the re-enactment requirement. To a great extent
then, state penal codes now apply to federal enclaves.
Where the United States alone once exercised sovereignty, the
many retrocessive statutes have resulted in a situation where the state
and federal governments exercise almost concurrent jurisdiction. The
court in Cornman based its decision on the present relationship
between state authority and residents of federal enclaves. The court
recognized that the state was imposing significant burdens of state
citizenship on the plaintiffs without extending to them the counter-
balancing right to vote in state elections. Cornman noted the existence
of the traditional view that the franchise cannot be extended to resi-
dents of areas under exclusive federal jurisdiction,4 7 and in fact,
reaffirmed this view." The court went on, however, to distinguish
the line of precedents denying the right to vote from the situation
where the federal government has retroceded to a state4" all or sub-
stantially all of the incidents of jurisdiction, in which latter case the
state could not constitutionally deny the right to vote. The factual
situation in Cornman was somewhere between these two extremes,
and the court, balancing the amount of jurisdiction exercised by the
two sovereigns in light of the nature of the right being asserted, con-
cluded that it violated the equal protection guaranteed by the four-
teenth amendment for the state to deny plaintiffs the right to vote.
A CHANGING VIEW
The clear weight of authority,5" viewed narrowly, supports the
view taken by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Royer v. Board
of Election Supervisors,"' that where the federal government possesses
exclusive jurisdiction over territory, residents of the federal area are
not residents of the state for purposes of voting in state elections. In
Royer, the residents of an area under exclusive federal jurisdiction
argued that since they were forced to pay state taxes, but could not
vote in state elections, they were victims of "taxation without repre-
sentation." In denying the enclave residents voting rights, the court
expressed the opinion that this "colonial slogan" was not without
exceptions and cited Washington, D.C., as an example.5 2
47. E.g., Herken v. Glynn, 151 Kan. 855, 101 P.2d 946 (1940) ; Royer v. Board
of Election Supervisors, 231 Md. 561, 191 A.2d 446, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 921 (1963) ;
Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306 (1869); see Gerwig, The Elective Franchise for
Residents of Federal Enclaves, 24 Gro. WASH. L. Rev. 404 (1956) ; 109 U. PA. L.
Rzv. 1014 (1961).
48. Where the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over land located
within the geographical boundaries of a state, it can hardly be doubted that no
constitutional right of a resident of the enclave is infringed by the state's refusal
to grant such resident the right to vote.
295 F. Supp. at 656.
49. Arapajolu v. McMenamin, 113 Cal. App. 2d 824, 249 P.2d 318 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1952) ; Rothfels v. Southworth, 11 Utah 2d 169, 356 P.2d 612 (1960) ; Adams v.
Londeree, 139 W. Va. 748, 83 S.E.2d 127 (1954).
50. See note 27 supra.
51. 231 Md. 561, 191 A.2d 446, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 921 (1963).
52. Id. at 566, 191 A.2d at 449. The court in its opinion stated:
Moreover, we need only look to the District of Columbia, once a part of Mary-
land before exclusive jurisdiction was ceded to the Federal Government, to see
[VOL. XXIX
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The Royer court, however, relied on precedent which arguably
dealt with a different factual situation. In the older cases, there
existed "exclusive jurisdiction." In Royer, however, while there may
have existed "exclusive jurisdiction" in a technical sense, there was in
fact no operative exclusive jurisdiction. This lack of operative exclu-
sive jurisdiction was recognized in Arapajolu v. McMenamin,"3 Adams
v. Londeree,54 and Rothfels v. Southworth."5  Cornmnan relied on these
three cases for its holding that enclave residents cannot be denied the
right to vote where substantial incidents of jurisdiction have been
returned to the states, while Royer distinguished these cases and
instead applied the prevailing view.
In Arapajolu, residents of military reservations in Monterey
County, California were denied the right to register as voters. Since
all of the plaintiffs had resided on reservations for the length of time
required to gain voting rights, the only question presented was whether
the reservations, which had theretofore been under exclusive federaljurisdiction, were "within" Monterey County. The court first re-
affirmed the principle that where Congress exercised exclusive juris-
diction over a territory, the area was no longer a part of the state.
The court found, however, that exclusive federal authority within such
areas no longer existed since jurisdiction over various matters had
been receded to the states. In reaching its decision the court dis-
tinguished earlier election cases on the ground that they were decided
prior to congressional retrocession of jurisdiction to the states.5" The
Royer court attempted to distinguish Arapajolu by reasoning that the
case was decided by an intermediate court, and that the outcome
turned on the court's construction of a local statute. This reasoning
is at best doubtful. While it is correct that the case was decided by
an intermediate court, the rationale of the decision in no way depended
upon a local statute. Plaintiffs were denied the right to vote in state
elections because the state had ceded exclusive jurisdiction to the
United States. The court upheld the right to vote because it found
retrocessions of numerous incidents of jurisdiction to the states -
that the right to tax is not inseparable from the right to vote, for the residents
of that area are taxed although they have no right to vote for the persons who
impose the taxes....
Id. In Herken v. Glynn, 151 Kan. 855, 101 P.2d 946 (1940), the dissent took theposition that the act which admitted Kansas to the Union allowed state residency forinmates of a federal veteran's home. The statute provided that the state should consist
of all territory within certain boundaries. Since the home was located within theseboundaries, it was effectively within the state. The inmates, therefore, were state
residents and should, according to the rationale of the dissent, be entitled to vote. The
twenty-third amendment to the United States Constitution gives the right to votein national elections to residents of the District of Columbia. They still have no legis-
lative representation, however, and hence they continue to be subjected to "taxation
without representation."
53. 113 Cal. App. 2d 824, 249 P.2d 318 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952).
54. 139 W. Va. 748, 83 S.E.2d 127 (1954).
55. 11 Utah 2d 169, 356 P.2d 612 (1960).
56. The court distinguished Arledge v. Mabry, 52 N.M. 303, 197 P.2d 884 (1948),
which was decided after the stated recessions of jurisdiction, on the ground that the
Arledge court considered these new enactments, but assumed that the United States
still retained jurisdiction. See Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 1193, 1197 (1954).
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that is, because "[t]he jurisdiction over these lands is no longer full
or complete or exclusive."
57
Adams and Rothfels were also distinguished in Royer.5" In
Adams, a writ of mandamus was brought to strike the name of
defendant, a candidate for mayor of South Charleston, from the ballot
and from the voter's registration records. Defendant was a resident
of the United States Naval Reservation located within the bounds
of the city of South Charleston. The issue before the court was
stated thusly: "Obviously, the question reduces itself to whether
Londeree was a citizen and resident of the State, within the meaning
of the State constitutional provision, while residing on the reserva-
tion."'59 The United States acquired the land about 1917, and the
only reservation of jurisdiction by the state was for the purpose of
serving civil and criminal process. 60 In 1931 the legislature amended
the Code and provided that all cessions to the United States should
be in the nature of concurrent jurisdiction. While the court discussed
the statute consenting to the cession of jurisdiction to the United
States, the decision did not turn on this statute, but rather, the out-
come of the case depended on the court's view that the state, in
ceding the territory, had retained sovereignty over the area to the
extent that such sovereignty does not conflict with the sovereignty
ceded to the United States.
In Rothfels, plaintiff, a civilian employee residing on a military
reservation, sought to compel defendant to register him as a qualified
voter. Plaintiff was denied registration on the ground that he was
not a resident of the state. The Utah Supreme Court held that a
civilian residing on a military reservation within the state had the
right to vote in state elections. A Utah statute, providing that a
person living on a military reservation is not to be considered a resi-
dent, was repealed by the legislature. 61 There was some question in
the case as to the nature of the sovereignty exercised by the United
States over the reservation in question. It does not appear, however,
as was stated in Royer, that "the state had reserved concurrent juris-
diction."6 In discussing the sovereignty exercised by the United
States, the court spoke of various incidents of jurisdiction exercised
by the state over the area, but these were mainly incidents of juris-
diction which had been retroceded to the state. 3 While a local statute
played a key role in the court's decision, the reliance by the court
on the decisions in Arapajolu and Adams makes it probable that the
same result would have been reached in the absence of such a statute.
57. 249 P.2d at 323.
58. In both the Rothfels and Adams cases there were powerful dissents, and the
decisions were rested on the local statutes and the fact that the state had reserved
concurrent jurisdiction. We think these cases are readily distinguishable and
not persuasive.
231 Md. at 566, 191 A.2d at 449.
59. 83 S.E.2d at 132.
60. Id.
61. UTAH LAWS 1896 c. 126 § 11(11), repealed by UTAH LAWS 1957 c. 38 § 1.
62. 231 Md. at 566, 191 A.2d at 449.
63. See notes 44-54 supra and accompanying text.
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The Royer court, relying on dictum in its earlier opinion in
Lowe v. Lower 4 and pointing to the failure of a bill in the Maryland
legislature the previous year which would have conferred voting
rights on enclave residents, rejected the later cases, reasoning that
the retrocession of certain aspects of jurisdiction neither amounted to
a general grant of concurrent jurisdiction nor compelled the states to
afford voting privileges, since ". . . the matter has traditionally been
left to adjustment between Federal and State legislative bodies."65
Thus, the court concluded, plaintiff's rights under the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment had not been violated. This
result is in direct conflict with that of Cornman. The easiest explana-
tion for the divergent outcomes in Royer and Cornman is that the
court in Royer felt compelled to follow the weight of precedent, while
Cornman, noting the changed circumstances occurring since many
of the decisions relied upon by Royer, enunciated a modern approach
which upholds the spirit of the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment, The court's holding that the right to vote could
not be denied plaintiffs was based on the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment. In effect, the court was stating that it
was discriminatory for Maryland to treat plaintiffs differently from
other citizens for purposes of voting in state elections. The equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment ". . . has long been
treated by the Court as a dubious weapon in the armory of judicial
review. But after eighty years of relative desuetude, the equal pro-
tection clause is now coming into its own."66  It was early stated
by the Supreme Court that the privilege to vote in a state is within
the jurisdiction of the state itself and is not incident to United States
citizenship,67 and the only check on the state's power was that it
could not be exercised so as to discriminate in violation of the Federal
Constitution. The equal protection clause, however, was not thought
to be applicable to such cases of discrimination.69 Indeed, full recog-
nition of the availability of protection of the right to vote through
use of the equal protection clause was not established until the decision
in Reynolds v. Sims.7 0 The equal protection clause operates both as
a limitation on permissible classification and as a ban on discrimina-
tory legislation.7 ' One commentator 72 has stated that there are two
types of limitations on the right to vote which are constitutionally
permissible: those which promote intelligent or responsible voting
and those which have as their purpose the separation of those with
64. 150 Md. 592, 133 A. 729 (1926).
65. 231 Md. at 565, 191 A.2d at 449.
66. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. Rgv.
341 (1949). Compare Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937), with Harper v. State
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
67. Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904).
68. Id. at 632.
69. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589 (1964) (dissenting opinion of Harlan, J.).
70. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). See 16 AM. U.L. Rtv. 128 (1966).
71. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) ; Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the
Laws, 37 CALIF. L. Rev. 341 (1949).
72. 67 MIcH. L. Rv. 1260 (1969).
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a substantial interest in the outcome of an election from others with
little or no such interest.73  In Cornman, the treatment accorded
plaintiffs could only be defended on the ground that they had no sub-
stantial interest in the outcome of the elections. Under the rationale
of the older line of cases,74 this might have been a valid reason for
denying residents of federal enclaves the right to vote in state elections.
Since plaintiffs in most respects were subject to the same burdens as
any other "citizen" of Maryland, it is no longer accurate to say that
they were not substantially interested in the outcome of state elections.75
The Cornman decision is of significantly greater impact than the
decisions in Adams, Rothfels, and Arapajolu. The earlier cases in-
volved state courts applying state law to determine if the particular
individuals fell within the ambit of state residence requirements. That
these cases were of little significance in contrast with the earlier
authorities is evidenced by their rejection by the Maryland Court of
Appeals six years ago in Royer. Cornman, however, leaves no doubt
that the question is not one to be "left to adjustment between the
Federal and State legislative bodies. ' 7' The court was clear that when
a state subjects an individual to substantial burdens of state citizen-
ship, it cannot deny that individual the right to vote without violating
the fourteenth amendment. In so ruling, not only did the court bring
about a reversal of Royer, but it has, in effect, given the right to vote
in local elections to all qualified residents of federal enclaves over which
a state exercises any significant jurisdiction. This result, although
seemingly a reversal of the traditional view, is more properly charac-
terized as a proper application of the substantive basis of the old rule.
The rationale for denying the resident of a federal enclave the right
to vote was articulated -in Commonwealth v. Clary:77 ". . . no hard-
ship is thereby imposed on those [enclave] inhabitants; because they
are not interested in any elections made within the state, or held to
pay any taxes imposed by its authority, nor bound by any of its laws." ' s
Since residents of enclaves are now in fact subject to numerous inci-
dents of state sovereignty, the factual basis for the traditional rule no
longer prevails, and it is proper that the rule no longer be applied.
CONCLUSION
Since Arapajolu v. McMenamin,79 there has been strong criticism
of the view that the federal government has receded parts of its ex-
73. E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) ; Lassiter v.
Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
74. See note 77 infra and accompanying text.
75. It should also be noted that decisions which have rejected the theory of the
extraterritorality of the federal enclave support the view that residents of federal
enclaves are "within" the state which encompasses the enclave. E.g., Howard v. Com-
missioners, 334 U.S. 624 (1954).
76. Royer v. Board of Election Supervisors, 231 Md. 561, 565, 191 A.2d 446, 449,
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 921 (1963).
77. 8 Mass. 72 (1811).
78. Id. at 77.
79. 113 Cal. App. 2d 824, 249 P.2d 318 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952).
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clusive jurisdiction over federal enclaves to the states.80 Logically
it would seem that once the United States has acquired exclusive
authority over an area, it can be returned to the state only through
positive congressional recession."1 An examination of the statutes
which appear to recede jurisdiction over enclaves to the states reveals
an intent by Congress to avoid any change in the sovereign control
possessed by the federal government.8 2 These statutes, it is argued,
merely permit the state to exercise a right - they do not confer any
sovereignty upon the state.8 Congress may repeal such retrocessive
laws at any time, thus removing exclusive federal areas from the juris-
diction of state laws." Had there been an actual retrocession ofjurisdiction, this would not be the case. Jurisdiction having once
been returned to the state, it would require the consent of the state to
cede such jurisdiction back to the federal government.88
Such criticism is fairly persuasive and has probably accounted
for the heretofore minimal acceptance of Arapajolu. The fact remains,
however, that whether states are permitted or empowered to impose
obligations on enclave residents, the residents are nonetheless very
much under state jurisdiction. They are forced to abide by state laws,
pay state taxes, and generally act as state citizens. They are even
considered state residents for certain purposes.8 8 Even if the state
has enacted no applicable legislation, the mere fact that it is empowered
to do so should be sufficient reason for extending the franchise.
Regardless of the type of sovereignty exercised over them or their
places of residence, it would seem that enclave inhabitants should be
able to vote for the legislators who make the laws by which they
must abide.
80. See Gerwig, The Elective Franchise for Residents of Federal Areas, 24 Gso.
WASH. L. Rxv. 404, 418-20 (1956); Sewell, The Federal Enclave, 33 TENN. L. Rzv.
283, 306-09 (1966).
81. 109 U. PA. L. Rgv. 1014, 1016 (1964), citing, INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE
FOR THE STUDY 0F JURISDICTION OVER FEDERAL AREAS WITHIN THE STATES, pt. I,
at 72-73 (1956). But see S.R.A., Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558 (1946) (which held
that if the area ceased to be used for a federal purpose, the exclusive jurisdiction
automatically terminates); La Duke v. Melin, 45 N.D. 349, 177 N.W. 673 (1920)(which implied that it was possible for the United States to lose jurisdiction by
abandonment, as where military reservations are opened to homesteaders, and no
retrocession of jurisdiction is necessary).
82. Gerwig, The Elective Franchise for Residents of Federal Areas, 24 Go.
WASH. L. RPv. 404, 418-19 (1956). See, e.g., 4 U.S.C. § 108 (1964), which states:
The provisions of sections 105 to 110 of this title shall not for the purposes of
any other provision of the law be deemed to deprive the United States of ex-
clusive jurisdiction over any Federal area over which it would otherwise have
exclusive jurisdiction or to limit the jurisdiction of the United States over any
Federal area.
83. See Gerwig, The Elective Franchise for Residents of Federal Areas, 24 Gzo.
WASH. L. Rzv. 404, 418-20 (1956) ; Sewell, The Federal Enclave, 33 TENN. L. Rv.
283, 306-09 (1966).
84. Sewell, The Federal Enclave, 33 TENN. L. R.v. 283, 302 (1966).
85. See notes 13-17 supra and accompanying text.
86. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 23 (1966) states that enclave residents are con-
sidered residents of the state for divorce and adoption proceedings in state courts.
They are also considered state residents in apportioning Maryland's seats in the
United States House of Representatives. Cornman v. Dawson, 295 F. Supp. 654,
657 n.7, appeal granted sub nom. Evans v. Cornman, 38 U.S.L.W. 3114 (U.S. Oct. 14,
1969) (No. 236). See 109 U.PA. L. Rxv. 1014, 1017 (1961).
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It may be that the right of access to state courts or the right to
have the state provide equal educational opportunities requires a
different balancing of the elements of jurisdiction being exercised by
the state and federal governments. But the elective franchise is the
most important privilege of a democratic society, 7 and it must be
considered apart from the ordinary rights of citizenship. As the
Supreme Court stated in Williams v. Rhodes,8 "other rights, even
the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined." 9
87. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968) ; Carrington v. Rash, 380
U.S. 89, 96 (1965).
88. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
89. Id. at 31.
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